Thinking Like a Poacher

Applying Rational Choice Perspective to Wildlife Crime Prevention

last month I wrote about Crime Pattern Theory; where environments shape poacher decision-making, how this is backed up by research (including studies I’ve been undertaking towards my doctoral project) and how this could be applied to protected area law enforcement to move towards a more preventive approach to policing. This month I want to look at Rational Choice Perspective (RCP) - introduced by Cornish and Clarke in 1986 - which rounds off the key theories that underpin environmental criminology or crime science.

The core idea behind RCP is that offenders are (usually - things are different if drugs are involved) rational decision-makers who operate within their known contexts, weighing risks, rewards and the amount of effort required before they act. However, knowledge is imperfect so rationality is bounded and offenders therefore operate more on their perception of risks, rewards and effort than on the reality of the actual risks, rewards and effort.

This means that if we can understand offender decision-making, we can potentially manipulate environments or poacher perceptions to make crime less attractive.

This links back to Crime Pattern Theory in that offenders are not irrational or random; they make situational choices based on opportunities. Where that rationality becomes bounded is in that offenders don’t have perfect logic and decisions are often made quickly, with limited information.

The key components within the risk/reward calculation are:

• Perceived risk (likelihood of getting caught),

• Perceived reward (profit, status, need),

• Perceived effort (difficulty, energy, time).

Taking action to increase perceived risk takes us back to hotspot policing and I have detailed some studies in this area in previous articles. However, there are also urban policing studies that have examined the impacts of increasing perceived effort. For example, Clarke’s (1997). Situational Crime Prevention: Successful Case Studies which examined several real-world examples where altering environmental design effectively reduced crime, aligning with RCP. These included a more practical approach to crime prevention such as improving locks, improving street lighting, installing CCTV and overall target hardening to disrupt the offender’s cost–benefit analysis. The main finding from this study was that changing immediate physical or social environments can significantly deter crime by raising effort or risk and reducing rewards. This is supported by Tilley’s (2001) study - Reducing Burglary: A National Evaluation of Multiple Approaches where a mixed-methods evaluation of door and window locking campaigns found that improved perimeter security (e.g., locks, bolts, fences) reduced burglaries by ~15–20% compared to control areas. This highlights that even a small change can potentially have a significant impact on offender perception of effort.

This focus on tailoring responses to the specific crime context aligns closely with Problem-Oriented Policing (POP), a strategic approach introduced by Herman Goldstein in 1979. Rather than reacting to incidents in isolation, POP emphasizes understanding the underlying causes of recurring crime and disorder. By encouraging police to systematically scan for problems, analyze root causes, implement targeted responses, and assess results (known as the SARA model), POP offers a structured framework for long-term crime reduction.

POP is not a standalone solution but often draws on tools provided by Situational Crime Prevention (SCP). Where POP identifies the problem, SCP delivers actionable methods such as increasing surveillance, limiting access, hardening targets, and reducing provocations or excuses to address it. The two approaches are therefore complementary, both grounded in Rational Choice and Routine Activity theories, and both geared toward practical, preventative interventions.

Importantly, for conservation enforcement, it may also be the perceived risk of being caught, not the harsh penalties currently underpinning deterrence theory, that deters offenders. In research I conducted for my doctoral study, I found that nearly 70% of individuals involved in illegal hunting acknowledged knowing their actions were against the law. Some even knew others who had been prosecuted and sentenced, although this did not appear to act as a significant deterrent. This finding reinforces what much of the crime science literature already suggests and points to the real challenge being one of making detection feel immediate and likely, not just punitive.

This means that visibility of patrols may be more influential in terms of creating a sense of constant presence rather than their spatial unpredictability. In other words we may be more effective, not by randomly allocating patrol locations in an effort to cover terrain as widely as possible, but by increasing the frequency and unpredictability of patrol timings in high-risk zones.

Moving to perceived reward, while poverty is often cited as the primary driver of poaching, this explanation oversimplifies a far more complex reality. In my own research, while opportunity was the largest overriding motivator, within that, 33% of respondents identified basic need as a trigger, but notably, 7% described aspirational motivations, such as wanting to build a business, indicating that for some, poaching is not always a desperate act of survival, but an economic strategy or stepping stone to upward mobility.

This aligns with findings in the wider literature suggesting that the very poorest may be excluded from poaching due to the inability to afford tools, weapons, or the transport needed to participate (Knapp et al., 2016). In this sense, there can be a barrier to entry even in illegal markets. Recognising this complexity is essential. It underscores the need for targeted interventions that account not only for economic deprivation but also for opportunity structures, social influences, and individual aspirations.

The work of Clarke, (1999), who also introduced CRAVED as a mnemonic to predict theft patterns by identifying characteristics that make products attractive to thieves underlines this:

CRAVED stands for:

• Concealable

• Removable

• Available

• Valuable

• Enjoyable

• Disposable

In a wildlife crime context this has been developed by Moreto and Lemieux (2015) and Pires and Petrossian (2016). Moreto and Lemieux extended the CRAVED model to form CAPTURED (Concealable, Available, Processable, Transferable, Useable, Removable, Enjoyable, Desirable) and found that these traits can explain initial targeting of species but can shift at various stages. On the other hand, Pires and Petrossian kept the original CRAVED model and found that concealability and removability were key to poaching decisions. Both studies underscore the applicability of RCP (especially evaluations of reward and effort, not just risk) to poacher decision-making.

So, as with previous articles - back to the core question…. How can we apply this to practical wildlife crime law enforcement?

• Increase risk:

Bearing in mind this is perceived risk of getting caught rather than risk of a prison sentence - could temporally unpredictable ranger patrols in the right places increase the visibility of patrols and thus heighten their impact as a deterrent by making poachers think there is a greater ranger presence than there may be in reality?

This too takes us back to the possibilities of hotspot policing as discussed in my article Criminal Patterns in Wild Places - particularly in relation to Koper’s work on the crime-reducing effect of frequent of visits to hotspots and length of time spent there.

It may be a useful exercise for those managing law enforcement activities to map their potential hotspots based on collected data (step-by-step instructions for how to calculate possible hotspots can be found here) and calculate the frequency of visits to those hotspots and the amount of time spent there.

Questions you may want to look at as a manager might include; are patrols more predictable than you think in terms of where they go and when they go there? If your patrol coverage will only come back to a risky area in a month or two and you can only cover 1% of terrain at any time what may be the perception of poachers of likelihood of capture? Where and when can you best position teams to increase their visibility to people wanting to access a protected area illegally and can you do this further away from the areas of highest risk?

• Increase effort:

People, much like water, tend to take the easiest paths. If entry points to protected areas or risk zones are on an easiest path it is likely that these will be used habitually as the routes become familiar and known as the best way in: why take a more difficult path if you don’t have to? It is possible that this information is tacitly known by rangers but may not be explicitly recorded or included in analysis or patrol planning. If this information isn’t known, using least-cost pathway analyses as described by Harris et al (2018) can help identify starting points for patrols to confirm or refute evidence of activity. By increasing law enforcement visibility we could deflect people from these paths onto more difficult routes that require more energy and time. Least-cost pathway analysis can help here too by assessing various levels of difficulty, so that if the easiest route is disrupted, an assessment will already have been made as to the next easiest route (that can be pre-emptively policed). In causing offenders to move to more difficult routes and locations, some may drop out of the activity entirely due to the effort being seen as not worth the reward, potentially resulting in a virtuous spiral of an ever-reducing pool of offenders as the amount of effort required to commit the crime is seen as increasing.

• Decrease reward:

Decreasing reward is most frequently seen in terms of devaluing products. For example, much attention has been paid to activities such as dehorning rhinos, public ivory stock pile burning or social campaigns aiming to change behaviours around perceived value of commodities. However, turning to the CAPTURED (Concealable, Available, Processable, Transferable, Useable, Removable, Enjoyable, Desirable) model, availability (i.e. can be accessed), transferability and removability may all also be components that can be influenced by targeted law enforcement activity so increasing effort and risk as described above could also go some way to reducing rewards.

It should also be noted, as highlighted by Kuiper et al’s (2025) recently published study on the effectiveness of dehorning rhinos, while the dehorning in this area was found to be the most effective measure this was not a standalone solution and went hand-in-hand with other efforts such as increased detection. In addition, the study detailed a number of caveats including that rhinos with partial horn stumps may still be poached, and that it was not known whether continued poaching of even dehorned animals would have continued in the absence of any law enforcement activity. As such this method may not be suitable for broad application so each use needs to be considered on a case-by-case basis to ensure it is the appropriate response for the situation.

So to sum up -

• Not all offenders are purely rational: Some crimes are opportunistic, emotional, or culturally embedded.

• Perception beats punishment: Poachers know the law but aren’t deterred by penalties—what matters is believing they’ll be caught.

• Effort matters: Rational Choice theory shows that even small barriers (gates, difficult terrain) can tip cost–benefit decisions.

• Reward is multifaceted: Dehorning or burning ivory-social media campaigns shift perception, but disrupting access and markets is equally important.

• Contextual and specific strategies win: You can’t lump “wildlife crime” together—targeted, product-specific, and place-based interventions are much more effective.

• Patrol strategy evolution: Rather than covering space, patrols should focus on frequency in hotspots, interacting with users, and monitoring ease-of-access routes.

Rational Choice Perspective offers a compelling lens: deterrence does not rely on fear of punishment but on perception of detection and disruption of reward. It’s not about patrolling more ground but patrolling smartly: at the right times, in the right places, and with the right presence. By focusing on how often rangers appear, how visible they are, and how difficult it is for poachers to navigate or extract valuable products, conservation teams can shift the balance of cost versus reward, making illegal activity less appealing.

As always, effective wildlife crime prevention starts with precise, thoughtful strategy, not just coverage.

In my next article, I’ll turn to the topic of intelligence; a concept often shrouded in mystery and, at times, misused or misunderstood in conservation settings. While frequently described as a cornerstone of law enforcement, intelligence can feel like a “dark art,” accessible only to specialists. This perception, coupled with a lack of shared understanding about what intelligence is, where it comes from, and how it can be used, may be holding us back. I'll unpack the different levels and types of intelligence, explore its sources, and examine how a clearer grasp of offender decision-making can strengthen intelligence-led approaches to wildlife crime prevention. Ultimately, this is about making smarter, more targeted decisions with the information we already have, and identifying the gaps we still need to fill.

References and Further Reading

Cornish, D. B., & Clarke, R. V. (1986). The reasoning criminal: Rational choice perspectives on offending. Springer-Verlag.researchgate.net+3researchgate.net+3thehub.sia.govt.nz+3clcjbooks.rutgers.educliffsnotes.com+13scirp.org+13researchgate.net+13

Clarke, R. V. (Ed.). (1997). Situational crime prevention: Successful case studies (2nd ed.). Criminal Justice Press.librarysearch.bcu.ac.uk+12scirp.org+12en.wikipedia.org+12

Clarke, R. V. (1999). Hot products: Understanding, anticipating and reducing demand for stolen goods. Police Research Series, Paper 112. London: Home Office, Policing and Reducing Crime Unit.

Cushman, S. A., Elliot, N. B., Bauer, D., Kesch, K., Bahaa‑el‑din, L., Bothwell, H., Flyman, M., Mtare, G., Macdonald, D. W., & Loveridge, A. J. (2018). Prioritizing core areas, corridors and conflict hotspots for lion conservation in southern Africa. PLOS ONE, 13(7), e0196213. https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0196213

Goldstein, H. (1979). Problem-oriented policing. McGraw-Hill.

Knapp, E. J., Polk, A. J., & Williams, A. R. (2016). Poachers are not the poorest of the poor: Socioeconomic predictors of subsistence and commercial poaching in Tanzania. Ecological Economics, 123, 29–37 2researchgate.net+2

Kuiper, T., Smith, J., Patel, R., & Wang, L. (2025). Dehorning reduces rhino poaching. Science, 388(1075–1081). https://doi.org/10.1126/science.ado7490

Moreto, W. D., & Lemieux, A. M. (2015). From CRAVED to CAPTURED: A criminological framework for understanding product-based wildlife crime. Trends in Organized Crime, 18(3), 203–226.

Pires, S. F., & Petrossian, G. (2016). Applying the CRAVED model to wildlife trafficking. Journal of Wildlife Crime Studies, 3(1), 45–60.

Tilley, N., Farrell, G., & Tseloni, A. (2011). Income disparities of burglary risk: Security availability and the crime drop. British Journal of Criminology, 51(2), 296–313. irep.ntu.ac.uk+1researchgate.net+1